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Abstract
This paper is a case  study of what is recognized  as one of  improvement programs  (such  as those adapted  from
the more successful projects in  any country in  the Europe  Japanese  programs). The prime  mover for these
and Central  Asia region,  not to mention  in the poorest  programs is the quasi-public  restructuring  agency, ARIA,
country  of the region-Moldova.  The ARIA  project  which  was established as part of the Moldova Private
shows new ways to attack some of the most intractable  Sector Development I loan. ARIA was structured  to try
problems  of private  sector development  in Europe  and  to combine private  sector entrepreneurship  with a public
Central Asia:  how to facilitate reorganization  and  function in the process  of restructuring  and bankruptcy.
liquidation bankruptcies;  how to promote  small  and  The study tries  to account for the strategies and
medium enterprise  spin-offs and new start-ups;  and how  innovations that lead to  results.  And  it tries to connect
to promote  new learning at the enterprise  level,  both in  the ARIA strategy to past development  literature by
the form of "Marshall  Plan"  programs with  more  viewing  the study through Albert  Hirschman's work on
advanced  post-socialist countries,  as well  as continuous  social  learning and change.
This paper-a joint product of the Office  of the Senior Vice  President and Chief Economist,  Development Economics,  and
the Private and Financial Sectors Development Unit,  Europe and Central Asia Region-is part of a larger effort in the Bank
to draw and interpret lessons from best practices. Copies of the paper are available free from the World Bank, 1818 H Street
NW,  Washington,  DC 20433.  Please contact Narin Jameson,  room MC4-333,  telephone  202-473-0677,  fax  202-522-
1158,  email  address njameson@worldbank.org.  Policy  Research  Working  Papers are also  posted on  the Web at http://
econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at dellerman@worldbank.org  or vkreacic@worldbank.org.  July 2002.
(19 pages)
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to  encourage the exchange of ideas about
development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly,  even if the presentations  are less than  fully polished. The
papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations,  and conclusions expressed in this
paper  are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the
countries they represent.
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I/II in Moldova.Introduction
After a decade of World Bank projects in the transitional  economies of Europe and Central Asia,
the PSD I/II project in Moldova is recognized as more successful than projects with similar aims
in other countries.  The areas where the project was relatively successful include:
*  Setting up a restructuring agency ("ARIA"),
*  Implementing a restructuring bankruptcy ("Chapter  11 ") program,
*  Implementing a liquidation bankruptcy program to seed new start-ups,
*  Building up capacity in the local private consulting sector,
*  Fostering spin-offs as systematic restructuring strategy,
*  "Marshall  Plan" study tour programs for managers,
*  "Marshall  Plan" work tour programs for blue collar workers, and
*  Systematic  implementation of continuous improvement ("Japanese-style")  programs in
firms.
When a project has had such relative success where other projects with similar goals have failed,
some attempt must be made to understand the different strategies that may account,  in part, for
the different outcomes.  Our task here is not to catalog those successes [see World Bank 2001 a,
200 lb and Siegelbaum 2001] but to try to give some explanation for them.
Two  Strategies for Renewal:  Replacement  or Transformation
In the face of decline, there are always two different strategies for renewal: replacement or
transformation.  Albert Hirschman,  in his 1970 classic,  Exit,  Voice,  and  Loyalty: Responses to
Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States, developed these two strategies as the logic of exit
(replacement,  the quintessential  logic of the market) and the logic of loyalty, commitment, and
voice (transformation,  the quintessential  logic of stable organizations).
When facing decline,  a commitment-based  strategy "fights" for renewal by fostering the
transformation of the given people and structures.  An exit-based strategy sees renewal as
coming primarily and initially from the outside through "switching," the replacement of the
existing people (or at least the top people)  and structures by new ones.  Transform the old into
the new-or throw out the old (to create a tabula rasa) and then import the new; that is the
question.  All real world situations of decline will call for appropriate combinations of
transforming the old into the new (transformation  strategy) and replacing the old with the
externally-supplied new (replacement  strategy).
It should be noted that the replacement strategy depends on finding what is needed from some
external source, e.g., from the market.  If what is needed is not available  on the market then a
replacement-oriented  strategy will be of little avail.  One would have to transform what one
already has.  For instance, a restructuring  strategy for a transitional economy might assume that,
as in an advanced market economy, there is a plethora of entrepreneurial and managerial  talent,
experience, and motivation available  "on the market."  It is only a matter of getting the macro-
economic conditions and the "investment climate" right, and then the entrepreneurs and
managers will "come forth" to take over and restructure  the failing firms.  Moldova was an
example where this replacement strategy was not working.  The macro-conditions  were stable
but foreign investors were not interested given the other opportunities, and there was little or no
2domestic market for entrepreneurial  and managerial talent.  In the beginning the Moldovans
would have to make do with what they had.
But, more generally,  there are other reasons to start with a transformation strategy-even if a
replacement strategy had more initial feasibility..
The Bank Mission Statement principle of "helping people help themselves"  and the
Comprehensive Development Framework principle of the "client in the driver's seat" indicate
how the two logics might be combined.'  If the client is to stay in the driver's seat, then enough
of the home-grown old must be transformed into the new so that the client does not "lose his
footing" and become so estranged  from the change process that his only response is to either
cling to the old or to sullenly give in to the new (all the while hoping it will fail).  With a sound
foundation of footing on the home-grown but transformed old, the client can then take charge of
throwing out part of the old and to appropriate and adapt the imported new to make it his own.
The alternative is a process externally driven by replacement of the old with the imported new
where the clients are "blown off their feet" and are being swept along without any real ownership
by imposed conditionalities or other forces outside their control.
Hence the question is: how can the Bank design projects and programs on the basis of enough
transformation  of the home-grown  old into the new so that the clients will thereby gain
"ownership" of the process and will have the foundation from which to then open up, acquire,
and appropriate the knowledge and experience available to them in a globalized world?
The ARIA Project in Moldova
The Moldova PSD I/II project, which set up the ARIA Agency for Restructuring and Enterprise
Assistance  as a quasi-public NGO, made. a number of innovations (relative to standard projects)
to foster enough home-grown  transformation  so that the external knowledge and practices could
then be imported  and applied-with ownership-to the Moldovan context.
The program of PSD I/I  and of the ARIA agency was quite varied.  We will go over some of the
main features of the program highlighting the features that fostered enough local ownership  to
then import knowledge and practice and make them locally owned as well.  The spirit was to
foster a learning process to find the pragmatic answers that would work in Moldova, not to
supply a blueprint to be implemented.
Achieving self-sustainability:  long duration  of intervention
The typical World Bank project cycle of 3-5 years is too short for projects which aim to catalyze
such a Gargantuan task as the transformation of centrally planned enterprises  and into market
organizations  with the accompanying change in mentality.  In 1994 the World Bank did not have
instruments that could span a decade and a three consecutive  loans strategy was developed:2
PSD I would train hundreds of local consultants that would transform a hundred or so local
enterprises, and in the process create demand for management  training.  PSD II provided for
'See  http://www.worldbank.org/cdf/.
2More recently, Adaptable  Program Loans and other forms of programmatic  lending  addresses this problem.
3management  training and by enabling secondment of best managers abroad initiated a process of
substitution of clients and suppliers from the FSU with new ones from the non-FSU countries.
Transformed enterprises, managers,  consultants now generate  demand for a transformation of the
business environment-which is what PSD III might have done.  In this context, when there are
strong local constituencies pushing for reforms, the reforms have a much better chance of being
implemented.  So the first principle is taking a long term view of the transformation process.
Even an orderly exit proved not to be implementable  in short term as the most commonly failed
conditionalities had to do with the numbers of enterprises that had to be liquidated which the
governments refused to do or otherwise avoided doing.
Overview of ARIA Results
Since  1995,  The Moldova NGO - "ARIA" - has completed the restructuring of 90 enterprises.  An impact study
conducted of the Moldova Project indicates that outcomes have been both positive and significant, in terms of
productivity, sales growth, exports, tax payments and other areas.  Highlights of the results of the impact study
are as follows:
*  In 1995, the firms that were to receive project assistance were on average worse offat the outset than
comparable  Moldovan firms that were never helped by the project.
*  By the end of 1999, despite generally worsening economic conditions in Moldova,  Project-assisted firms
were more  productive andpaid  more taxes per worker, than their unassisted counterparts.
*  Project assistance is consistently, positively and significantly  correlated with real productivity growth,
growth in sales and growth  in exports.
*  Project-assisted  firms have been significantly more successful in attractingforeign  direct investment, have
changed  suppliers more aggressively, and rely less on barter  and offsets than other, comparable firms.
*  Project-assisted  firms have experienced greater  management turnover  than other firms.
*  The Project has, in connection with the restructuring  of  about 90 enterprises,  led to the creation of more
than 450 SMEs.  About 80 of these SMEs are spin-offs  from restructured enterprises and the remainder  are
either new businesses created from assets sold by restructured enterprises,  or independent small businesses
which have been attracted to newly-created industrial  parks.
*  Overall,  it is estimated that 9500 employees have been laid off in ARIA restructurings,  while a total of
10800 new jobs have been created.
[Source:  'New  Firms from Old: Building Capital through Enterprise Restructuring."  Memorandum  by Paul
Siegelbaum,  Washington:  World Bank, May 2001.]
Achieving self-sustainability: large scale of  intervention
To make the  home-grown process of transformation  self-sustainable,  one or two footholds is not
enough; the inertia of inherited soviet enterprise behavior and dominant rent-seeking would
quickly choke the few firms behaving differently.  So the second principle in designing self-help
programs is the scaling up to a critical mass of local advisors capable of restructuring  mass
privatized enterprises, critical mass of managers  appropriating more global approaches and
management style, and a critical mass of reformed and restructured enterprises with owners that
understand the need for a level playing field (that does not favor well-connected,  often dying
firms of  the past).  Working with associations of entrepreneurs,  publicizing widely achieved
results in Moldova and other transitional  economies accelerates formation of wider pro-reform
constituencies.
4Project "Initiation  ": Find  the "Moving Trains"
With the agreement reached with the client about the longer duration of project (now possible
through Adaptable  Program Lending-APLs) and scale of program that allows for more than a
few pilot enterprises to be restructured/downsized/created,  the critical task of the external task
manager (e.g., from the World Bank or other development  agencies) becomes identification  of
the best entry points for the project.  The third rule here would be: don't try to start anything
new.  Instead find where there are domestic beginnings-where  local trains are starting to move,
no matter how slowly, on their own steam.  Then figure out how to use your resources and
knowledge to assist-not take over-to assist  those home-grown beginnings.
As the poorest of the FSU countries, Moldova did not have the rather mixed blessing of natural
resources (oil, gas, or minerals) to allow it to float along on the resource rents without biting the
bullet of restructuring.  The consensus was there in the early-mid  90s that something had to be
done; the questions were who and how?
Finding  Leadership
In view of the politicization  and failure of most state-sector "restructuring agencies,"  the idea
was to make ARIA more of an independent quasi-public NGO.  That degree of independence
made it doubly important to find the right leadership and that, in turn, requires some experience
and judgment on the part of the task manager to find that person-a local champion,  or better
champions.  The first one would implement the project while the second one, usually a Cabinet
level politician, would play a "godfather" role presiding over the Supervisory Board of the
restructuring agency and would provide political support for thorough restructuring measures.
In the case of ARIA, the selected project leader, Georghe Efros, was a Deputy Minister of
Industry.  Parts of the government at the time would have preferred a less independent and less
entrepreneurial  individual who would be more inclined to do their bidding.  The Bank Project
Team insisted on Mr. Efros and it was only after a six month stand-off that the government
finally agreed.
The role of the "godfather"  cannot be underplayed.  In case of Moldova, the Deputy Prime
Minister responsible for Economic Reforms was the project champion in the GoM as well as the
Chairman of ARIA's Supervisory Council.  He was instrumental in the initial years in clearing
the way and protecting ARIA from opposition.  Especially vocal resistance came  from the lobby
group of red directors who reacted strongly to proposed restructuring methodology-downsizing
enterprises  to a level where they (or spun-off parts) could generate positive cash flows.  As the
government changed and ARIA lost its champion,  ARIA came under intensive and continuous
scrutiny through various inspections.
Two other countries where similar projects are under implementation or in the final stages of
preparation confirm critical importance of the champion.  In the first country the original
champion is still in power and the project is moving on.  In the second, three governments
changed during project preparation.  In the first two, there were strong champions and the project
preparation progressed  very well.  In the third government there is none and the project is
5stalling.  The lesson from here is-given the high uncertainty about the length of office of high
officials in the FSU-to look for multiple champions during project preparation.  A good
example is a new LIL in the Caucasuses where the Supervisory Council of the PIU will have
several Government officials, the Rector of the Polytechnics,  and representatives  of the donors
and the private sector.
Building Mutual Trust and Understanding
For community organizing or consulting for institutional reform to be successful,  it is
advantageous  for the external organizer or consultant to be able to see the client's actual
beginning situation (e.g., not treat it as an imagined blank slate) and, indeed, to see that situation
through the eyes of the client.3 That, in turn, is greatly facilitated by sharing some common
cultural and historical knowledge or experience (in addition to the obvious asset of being about
to converse in the client's language). This shared knowledge  extends from the general
understanding  of life in a communist country to specific items such as (in this case) Radio
Yerevan jokes or the cliches of Partisan movies.  Cultural affinity allows an empathetic
understanding of the client which allows the client to build trust of the organizer or consultant.
But trust needs to be mutual.  The importance of building mutual trust is highlighted by
considering the alternative approach of mistrust of the client evidenced by conditionalities.
Research [e.g., World Bank 1998] has repeatedly shown the ineffectiveness of conditionalities  in
getting reforms of any depth implemented.  The promise of aid can only buy a false-motivated
"intent to reform."  If the policies were not adopted by the government independently of the aid,
then the policies would tend to be
adopted  by aid-hungry  governments  in spite  of continuing  doubts of the policy
makers  themselves,  resistance  from  some  quarters  within  the  government,
onslaught  against  the  "deal"  from  the  opposition,  and  general  distaste  for the
whole procedure.
Naturally, doubts and reservations  are not voiced at the moment of the aid
compact;  hence  the  delusion  on the  part of the  donor that there has been  a full
meeting of minds.  But soon  after  virtue has  been  "bought"  through  aid  under
these conditions,  the reservations  and resistances  will  find some expression-for
example,  through  half-hearted  implementation  or  sabotage  of  the  agreed-to
policies-and relations between donor and recipient will promptly deteriorate as a
result. [Hirschman  1971, 205]
The genuine desire for reform and change can only be found, not bought, and, once  found,
trusting the client will cement a better relationship than "just in case" conditionalities.
Horizontal Learning by ARIA
There are two rather different models  for the knowledge-related  functions of the Bank, i.e., for
the Knowledge Bank.  In one model, the Bank has the answers obtained either from economic
3  "The change agent must psychologically zip him or herself into the clients' skins,  and see their situation  through
their eyes."  [Rogers 1983, 316]
6theory and first-world models or from scanning globally to find best practices from developing
countries which are then extracted by Bank staff, encapsulated, and retransmitted to clients to be
implemented (thus saving the clients the "trouble" of any genuine learning process).  That is the
storehouse-of-knowledge  model.  The alternative model is that of being a broker between the
clients who have a problem to solve and those who have had some practical success in solving
the problem.  The Bank as broker then supplies the resources to implement horizontal learning
directly between the clients and the people who carried out some best practice example.  That is
the knowledge broker model.
The learning process of the ARIA model was based on the broker model of horizontal learning.
There was no global best practice or 1000-page manual delivered from Washington on how to
restructure enterprises  in a post-socialist  economy.  Instead, three companies from (former East)
Germany,  Romania,  and Slovenia were contracted and each was "given" 3-4 enterprises  to
restructure  and provide on-the-job training for young Moldovan  consultants.  The expectation
that consultants from transitional environments  would be at least as efficient in an FSU country
as the ones from OECD proved to be correct.  Best results were achieved with a rather successful
model of restructuring utilized in Slovenia.  This approach was a perfect example of  horizontal
learning initiated by the Bank under PSD I.  The restructuring model was based on the extensive
experience of the Restructuring  Fund ("Sklad") of Slovenia and was developed by the founding
director of the Sklad, Uros Korze.  As Korze had then left the Fund, he was contracted through
the Central and East European Privatization Network (CEEPN) to assemble a team and set up a
temporary office in Moldova to supply hands-on training to ARIA.
In view of the dubious state of socialist accounting practices  for market purposes, the model
refocused management  on clear cashflow indicators and benchmarks that could be adapted to the
real existing post-socialist conditions in Moldova.  As ARIA has further developed and adapted
the model for their FSU conditions, ARIA has switched from apprentice to teacher to help foster
ARIA-like agencies  in other countries (e.g.,  Georgia, Ukraine,  and Armenia) through  a
continuing process of horizontal learning.
Building Local Consulting Capacity
The "PIU  Syndrome"
There is a common problem with Bank projects that aim to develop  local human capital.  The
Bank sets up a project implementation unit or some other specialized Bank-related organization.
The local staff in these organizations are quite keen to make themselves as indispensable  as
possible to perpetuate their elite status in the Bank-related  organization.  And Bank HQ staff are
grateful  to have local counterparts as guides and gatekeepers  who speak good English and "know
the ropes"  conceming Bank procedures.  This might be called the "PIU Syndrome."  It
unfortunately cuts against local capacity-building  for the requisite skills outside the PIU since
that would tend to make the PIU staff more expendable.
Most Bank projects face some version of the PIU syndrome.  In the case of Moldova PSD 11,
the fear was that ARIA would fall prey to the PIU syndrome.  The solution was simple and
effective.  Aside from a small support staff for the director, ARIA would have no permanent
staff.  All professional  staff in ARIA would be there only on short  term contracts with a clear
understanding that they either had to find a managerial job in the companies  they were
7restructuring or find new clients for ARIA-if they are to keep their jobs.  This philosophy of
making local professionals responsible for implementing changes they were proposing in the
client firms was directly opposite of the standard consulting practice (brought by consulting
firms from market economies).  Imported practice insisted on the advisory role of the consulting
services and leaving the responsibility for implementation  to very enterprise managers that
restructuring programs were trying to teach  "new non-soviet"  ways of management.
In  many cases, the ARIA staff had to "eat their own cooking" by temporarily replacing the failed
managers in the client companies.  The expectation was that, upon leaving, the staff would then
form or join private consulting companies  to then be hired directly by the client companies  or
even to join companies as turnaround managers.  Moreover,  it was part of the ARIA staff's job to
write'articles for the business and popular press so this helped both to propagate ARIA's work
and to build the reputation of the staff member as a qualified  consultant (and future private
consultant).  Thus instead of hoarding the professional skills in ARIA, ARIA was constantly
turning over its staff and seeding the private sector with trained restructuring consultants and
turnaround managers.
It should be noted that this staff rollover provision was part of ARIA's public purpose.  A private
consulting company would have every incentive to retain its trained staff, not to provide
incentives for consultants to take over managerial positions in the enterprises they were
restructuring or to form their own consulting companies.
The Foreign  Advisor Syndrome
The PIUJ staff are not the only ones with an incentive to hoard knowledge to perpetuate their
status.  That is a generic problem with any external consultants who would like a long-term
relationship and who thus must be careful not to pass so much knowledge to the client so that the
client could get along without them.  In the development business, this is a common problem
with foreign advisors usually paid by technical assistance funds from their home country-the
foreign advisor syndrome.
The foreign advisor problem is exacerbated by the internal  incentive systems of grant funded
programs and the nature of grant funded contracts in which the recipient country has very little
leverage. Thus tenders can have specials conditions about the size of companies, regional
distribution, or preventing  companies that have already won contracts in the past-effectively
limiting potentially best candidates from bidding.  Low leverage of recipient country allows
contractors to send their weakest consultants, leaving the best for more competitive  work in the
private sector in the global markets.  This combination  of low quality foreign advisors and a very
complex transitional environment  has resulted in very poor results and major skepticism in the
region on the value of technical assistance.-
This non-market selection process and poor accountability of foreign advisors is one of the main
arguments speaking in favor of borrowing for technical assistance by the FSU countries.  It
enables the client to control the design of the program, to specify the terms of references  for the
contract and the individual consultants,  and to fire the advisors in case of poor performance (very
difficult for grant-funded consultants).
8Since ARIA did tap some foreign TA funds, it had to face this problem.  The simple and
effective solution was two-fold.  Firstly, the terms of reference for the foreign advisors were to
teach the locals, e.g., ARIA staff, how to solve the problem, not to try to directly solve the
problem themselves.  Secondly, the TORs were written so that deliverables  were precise  and
allowed for cancellation  of the contract in the case of non-delivery.  If the foreign advisor wanted
to be invited back,  it would have to be by the companies formed by the trained staff after leaving
ARIA.  Thus the incentives  for the foreign advisors switched from making themselves
indispensable to ARIA-to training the ARIA staff well enough so that the staff could go out
into the private sector and get good enough consulting contracts to then invite the foreign
advisors back.
ARIA (as well as the Georgian and Ukrainian restructuring  agencies) had to learn fast how to
extract maximum from the foreign advisors they have hired.  The learning curve of local young
consultants is very steep and very quickly the foreign advisors find out that providing advise in
General Management  is not sufficient.  The locals soon start demanding specific and more
complex techniques  such as finance and ISO or continuous improvement  techniques (total
quality management).
The PIU and foreign advisor syndromes are present in most Bank projects.  The strategy of
developing and propagating local human capital needs to squarely  face these syndromes and find
similar solutions to fit the case.
ARIA 's Bankruptcy Role
Special Bankruptcy Agency?
In "normal market economies," the bankruptcy process (either as restructuring  or liquidation
bankruptcy)  is supervised by courts using trustees to work with the individual bankrupt firms.
The first wave of western advice (even in Moldova) was oriented to getting the court system in
the post-socialist  countries to take on that function in addition to the other revolutionary changes
necessary for the transition to a market economy.  However, in light of the transitional problems
particularly  in the FSU, too many firms had to go through either a restructuring  or liquidation
bankruptcy to be handled by the court-based systems even in the West, not to mention in the
transitional  economies.  Hence there is the need for some transitional agencies that will first
"clear the way" by (a) identifying the necessary changes in laws and regulations and (b)
demonstrate the benefits of releasing unused or underutilized  assets to entrepreneurs.  That was
one of ARIA's  important initial functions.
The idea of a special bankruptcy  agency was not new,  but there is a growing legacy of failures.
In the case of ARIA its role in pilot liquidations  (that was called "creation of Industrial Parks")
was the most controversial  one attracting fierce opposition form the "old guard".  It is exactly
this role of the liquidator that is-now that the Communists  have won absolute majority in the
Parliament and control the new Government-being  used by the new Govemment  as
justification for attempts to shut down ARIA.
What were some of the lessons that both informed the ARIA design as a bankruptcy agency and
that were reinforced by the positive ARIA experience?
9No Financing  Capacity
One argument in favor of an advice-giving agency also supplying finance is that the agency
should be willing to "put its money where its mouth is."  But this argument assumes that it is
acceptable  for the agency to take over "ownership" of the client-since  that is the likely
outcome.  Finance is not an issue in liquidation bankruptcy.  In restructuring bankruptcy,  it is
important to keep  "ownership"  and responsibility in the hands of the company management who
must turn around the company,  not in the hands of the agency.  Otherwise,  the company will
slide into the passive role of urging the agency to supply "just one more round" of financing  so
that the company will not be an embarrassing  "failure" of the restructuring  agency.  To avoid this
trap, the agency should not supply finance-full stop.
While ARIA technically could have tapped into a line of credit,  it never did and thus for practical
purposes, it did not have  a financing capability. ARIA consultants  and managers were told to
focus exclusively on internally generated funds obtained through sale and leasing of
underutilized equipment and space.  Furthermore they were told that if they turned to external
sources of finance such as EBRD or WB credit lines with interest rates of 22-25% per annum in
dollars the project would be regarded  as a failure.  Thus the lack of readily available financing
was turned from the agency's disadvantage to its advantage  in setting the precedent of selling
assets (under socialism, enterprises tended to hoard assets even though the assets  were unused).
There is another reason why it is a bad idea for a restructuring agency to have a financing
capability.  When the same agency is supplying both advice and finance, then the two will
inevitably become linked by conditionalities.  That will then falsify the motive for the client to
"take the advice."  When restructuring plans are "undertaken"  only as a condition to obtain
finance,  then the company and its management  will have little genuine "ownership"  of the plans,
and the agency will end up financing the costs of not restructuring.4
Cram-Down  Authority
In the early and mid-90s, the EBRD launched an ambitious Special Restructuring Program (SRP)
in a number of East European countries.  The first and perhaps only country where  the SRP was
fully implemented was Slovenia.  Following an international tender,  a foreign turnaround
specialist was hired to come live in Slovenia and run the program.  The SRP was tied to potential
finance through the EBRD.  In spite of considerable expertise on the part of the restructuring
team,  only one company was restructured  and privatized after several years and the program was
quietly discontinued.
What went wrong?  One of the key flaws in the program was the lack of any cram-down
authority on the part of the SRP.  The bankrupt companies had balance sheets full of soft loans
from Slovene public sector banks.  When the Slovene creditors saw the -SRP, which they
perceived as being backed by a deep-pocketed EBRD, enter the picture, their soft loans suddenly
became "hard legal obligations"  of the company.  If the company was not refinanced to pay off
its "legal obligations"  then the creditors could throw the company into liquidation bankruptcy
4"  There is a fundamental principle that should run through everything we do:  the IFIs should helpfinance the costs
of change-and.  should not cover the costs of  not changing." [Stem  2001,  168]
10thus giving the SRP a black eye instead of a much-needed  "quick win."  Thus the Slovene
creditors were not inclined to "take a haircut" on their past soft loans.  Since those loaned funds
were long since wasted, there was no chance to turn around companies without the creditors
taking their share of the losses.  Thus time and again, restructurable bankrupt companies  had to
be abandoned by the SRP due to the lack of any cram-down authority.  The wonder is that they
were able to do at least one deal.
ARIA  Restructuring  Bankruptcy Program
In spite of being sometimes seen as an NGO, ARIA by its founding legislation had a public
bankruptcy function.  But entry into the program was voluntary on the part of the companies.  By
joining the program, the company would receive assistance from ARIA to devise a restructuring
plan  with no finance from ARIA.  If the restructuring plan, which would typically involve
restructuring  debts, was accepted  by a sufficient majority of the Creditor Council, then it could
be implemented with cram-down authority over any dissenting creditors.  But if  the company
with ARIA's help could not devise an acceptable  restructuring plan, then the company would be
thrown into liquidation bankruptcy which would probably leave the creditors little recovery on
their loans.
Choosing the Entry Point: The "Best of the Worst" Principle
As there was always some choice of firms, ARIA pursued what has become known as the "best
of the worst" strategy.  By the "worst"  is meant enterprises  that have no rents to be squeezed out
by interfering bureaucrats  and had no local oligarchs trying to take the firm over.  Where there
are still rents to be had (e.g., natural resource-based  firms or tobacco companies),  managers and
government officials are likely to be more oriented to extracting the remaining rents than
undertaking deep restructuring programs.  Among the "worst"  no-rents-left firms, ARIA wanted
to work with the "best" ones-the ones that exhibited some initiative and potential for renewal.
"Best of Worst"  Oblasts in  Ukraine
It is important that an ARIA-like  project be  initiated in a country  or region  that is  small enough  so that a critical
mass of restructured enterprises,  trained  managers,  and consultants  can be reached in a 34 year period.  Moldova
is a small country  but in  the Ukraine, it was a matter of selecting a few oblasts to work with.  Of the 26 oblasts, 22
qualified  as being  "worst" in  the  sense  that they received  more than they  contributed to  the central  government.
All oblast  governors  were  interviewed  about their  readiness to  improve  the business  environment  and  invited to
submit a program about  what business  climate  reforms  they would implement  if the project  was piloted in their
oblast.  The  four that  were  eventually  selected  not  surprisingly  were  all  from  among  the 22  receiving  budget
support from the Center; the self-selection process provided the project again with  "the best of the worst".
SME Spin-Offs
Typically, socialist firms are too big-even in the best of times, not mention in the deep
transitional depression in Moldova.  Hence restructuring  involves not only down-sizing  the
workforce  and selling underutilized assets but also spinning off viable parts of the original firm
as independent small and medium-sized  enterprises.  The spin-offs  use what became known as
"asset drop-down transactions."  The new prospective owners of the spin-off (investors,
managers,  or workers) would form a new company with some limited initial investment.  Then
11the needed assets would be "dropped down" from the "mother firm" into the "daughter firm"
using a seller-supplied  credit purchase.  The daughter firm would make installment payments
back to the mother firm over a period of years to pay off the credit.  Sometimes the mother firm
might take some shares in the daughter in partial payment for the assets.  Some shares in the
daughter might be collateral that would revert to the mother with any default on the payments  so
that the daughter might end up more as a subsidiary than as a spin-off.
These asset drop-down spin-offs use seller-supplied  credit so these transactions could be and
were rather widely used in spite of the rudimentary  banking systems in the post-socialist
economies.
"Industrial  Parks"forNew  Start-ups
For the parts of the socialist dinosaurs that could not be saved or spun-off,  another creative
solution was developed.  Many of the middle managers might have "in the back of their heads"
ideas for small start-ups.  They might not have enough entrepreneurial  experience  to risk giving
up a job to undertake the start-ups.  But when their part of the firm is facing complete
liquidation,  then it might be a viable option.  Instead of putting the company space and assets up
for public auction, the company might be turned into an "industrial park" where middle managers
could exchange some of their unpaid wages for a lease for a certain time period of the space and
assets necessary for their new start-up.  They would have to scrap together any needed working
capital from their own sources.  Spaces not taken by these internal tenants would be offered to
external tenants.  In that matter, a defunct dinosaur with no future prospects might be turned into
an industrial park of new start-ups with a real future.  Slowly some of the start-ups would grow
hiring back a significant portion of the workers from the old company.
Rebirth in an Industrial Park
"One such renaissance  occurred through the ARIA-sponsored  liquidation  of textile  maker Spectrul.  A new
company,  Produse Tehnice,  was established  to manage  an  industrial  part on the  Spectrul  site  in the  city of
Chisinau.  Attracted  by  the ideal  location  near  major transportation  routes,  four spin-off textile businesses
soon  opened up,  followed  by private  SMEs  who  moved in  like Unolucas,  a tiny custom  design  furniture
company.  Its owners  had  searched for two years to  find an affordable  site for expanding  their home-based
business  and  were glad  to purchase a dilapidated  storage  facility  in the park.  After  extensive  renovations,
Unolucas  now  has  expanded  manufacturing  capabilities,  office  space,  and  a  showroom.  The  furniture
company  is one of 30  companies  currently operating  in the Spectrul  site,  where  total  employment  is now
450." (World Bank 2001b, 3]
After one or two industrial parks, a unit was formed to, be an "industrial park developer"  so that
each collapsing dinosaur does not have to reinvent the idea.  There are two points of particular
interest to facilitate the propagation of this experience.  Some might argue that the insiders
should not be given first option of the inside space for their start-ups; all assets should be put up
for public auction.  But the point is that it is the possibility of this "neat exit" from the collapsing
dinosaur that entices the managers  to switch from their usual strategy of lobbying for more
subsidies to the more entrepreneurial  strategy of going for the start-up.  Given their meager
resources,  the uncertainty surrounding a public auction might lead them to cling to their rent-
seeking  strategy of continuing subsidies.
12Secondly,  from the government side, the experience of seeing a few industrial parks with many
workers rehired in the emerging SMEs strengthens the government's hand to resist lobbying by
other failed firms.  Eventually the government sees that this sort of liquidation procedure can be
supported without social upheavals  and can even offer hope for economic renewal.
In developed  market economies,  liquidation bankruptcy and new business  start-ups are seen as
separate economic processes.  The down-sized workers will get jobs elsewhere (perhaps with
help from a social safety net in the intervening period), and entrepreneurs  will come from
elsewhere to buy the assets at auction.  It's the logic of exit and replacement.  There is a wealth of
organizational capital  so that one need not worry about a low-equilibrium trap that might result
from destroying the old without new organization capital coming forth.  But in underdeveloped
and transitional  economies,  these market processes  are too weak so that, more often than not,
failing enterprises will concentrate on lobbying rather than economic renewal.  And government
officials, fearing the social consequences,  will continue to supply the subsidies-all of which
creates a low-level trap.
The industrial park idea addresses this problem.  It makes bankruptcy and new business start-ups
the two sides of the same coin.  The organizational  capital of the middle managers and their
teams can be directly transformed  from the old to the new-without expecting some broader
economic processes to replace the old managers with the new entrepreneur-managers  from
elsewhere.
Spin-offs and industrial parks could be pursued systematically  as key restructuring  options in any
of the transitional economies.  In both these cases, as in the other cases, the overarching theme of
the ARIA programs  is enabling internal  transformation,  rather than promoting external
replacement.
Horizontal Learning for Enterprises
Trade Before Investment
The ARIA program was designed from the beginning to put the emphasis on the internal
transformation of the Moldovan enterprises rather than trying to attract foreign investors.  With
sufficient internal restructuring, then the enterprise would be in a position to strike a deal with a
foreign partner.  From the foreign partner's viewpoint, there should be "dating before marriage"
or, in other words, trade before investment.
Moreover, trade with Western companies  was of great interest even if it did not eventually lead
to some form of investment.  Hence  a new program PSD II was developed to foster trade
connections with Western companies.  In spite of all the sophisticated  trade promotion programs
developed in other countries, one of the crucial needs in Moldova was simply for managers to
know enough of a Western  language to start communicating first and eventually doing business
in the West.  ARIA purchased a set of language-training  computers from Italy and set up a
language training facility for managers.  The idea caught on and eventually managers were
coming to use the facility both day and night to learn English, Italian,  and German.  Moreover
they were paying for it (in spite of other free courses being offered by the British Council,
Goethe Institute, and the like).  ARIA was building an avant-garde  reputation  and managers
wanted to be a part of it.
13With the self-confidence born of learning enough Italian or English to get along and with the
quality improvements from restructuring,  some managers  were able to get subcontracting  deals
with Italian firms (e.g., in shoes, bags, and leather).  When other managers saw what their
colleagues  could accomplish with a little effort, they in turn became interested in the program.
The foreign supplier deals that grew in part out of the trade promotion program played an
important role in turning around a number of companies in Moldova.
The aim was not to attract foreign investment to "save" Moldovan  firms but to help Moldovan
firms to transform themselves  enough so that they could take advantage of foreign business-to
transform enough of the old so that they can appropriate and  "own" what could be newly
provided from external sources.
"Marshall  Plan  " Study Tours for Managers
The "Marshall Plan" has come to mean East-West horizontal learning programs.  In the case of
Moldova, horizontal learning programs  were developed for managers to visit firms in the
"relative-West,"  namely the more advanced post-socialist  countries in Central Europe (e.g.,
Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia).  Since the history of East-West technical
assistance is littered with failed or ineffective "Marshall-Plan"  programs, what was done
differently in the ARIA program?
In some past programs in Russia and other FSU countries, the Soviet-era managers would insist
that they could only learn from the advanced Western countries,  not from their previous
"satellites" in Central Europe.  They could only bring themselves to participate in the programs if
they could visit the USA or UK or other advanced West European countries.  Yet when they
discovered how advanced the enterprises were in those countries, then they invariably would say
that it was not applicable back in the FSU without purchasing the same latest technology.  Thus
the trips ended up as little more than enjoyable junkets.  From the viewpoint of usable lessons,
the world they had seen might as well of been "science fiction."
To avoid these "science fiction" junkets,  the ARIA Marshall Plan program was designed to only
take managers to see a plausible  future for them, e.g., the present realities in Central Europe.
Since the trips would require subsidies from the West, some education of Western donors was
needed to convince them that trips were needed to the relative-West, not the actual West.
Even when going to the relative-West,  managers still need preparatory programs so that they will
be able to understand and retain what they are seeing.  Hence ARIA ran competitive courses for
managers to both prepare them and to weed out those more interested  in a junket and those less
able to absorb the experience.
Another problem with other Marshall Plan programs is the limited impact of the leaming (e.g.,
only in the manager's  firm) and the need to focus the minds of some managers  on the lessons.
Both problems were addressed by requiring, as a condition to go on the trips, that the returning
managers would have to give a certain number of lectures to colleagues  from other firms and
prepare a number of publications  about what they had learned.  That both focused the minds of
14the managers on what they could learn and helped propagate  the learnings well beyond the
managers  selected for the trips.
"Marshall Plan"  Study Tours for Skilled Blue-Collar Workers
One of the quite unexpected innovations of the ARIA program was the extension of the study
tours to "work tours" for skilled workers.  In the relative-West,  as well as in the West, there is
demand for the gast-arbeiter  workers with skills to perform jobs (e.g., at night or over weekends)
that domestic workers might not want.  Yet the usual gast-arbeiter  arrangements  create social
problems for the host countries.
From the viewpoint of the Moldovan firms and workers, there would be great advantages  from
temporary gast-arbeiter  arrangements  to learn new skills and learn about new technologies-not
to mention the different pay scales.  Returning gast-arbeiters  have been a traditional  source of
skills and investment in eastern countries,  such as Yugoslavia and Turkey, that were open to
two-way travel.
Could the development potential of gast-arbeiter  arrangements  be systematically promoted
without the accompanying  social problems in the host countries?  ARIA together with Slovene
counterparts worked out a solution-an unexpected consequence of the Slovene consulting
relationship.  Groups of skilled blue-collar workers would be selected in Moldova according to
certain criteria.  They would be financed by their companies  to be placed for six months working
in Slovene companies and living together in apartments.  The workers would be paid at
minimum Slovene rates which were over five times their usual wages.  At the end of the six
months, they would have acquired not only industrial and technical  skills but also a nest-egg of
savings.  Some workers would buy a cheap used car in Slovenia and then drive back to Moldova.
Others would use their savings for investments back in Moldova.
Another consequence of the program is some subcontracting  and investment of Slovene
companies back into Moldova.  Some workers have come repeatedly.  Eventually the Slovene
hosts realized that they could subcontract  some of the low-end items to be produced back in
Moldova by the workers they had trained-perhaps  with some special machinery supplied from
Slovenia.  Thus the "trade" in the form of temporary fixed-term migration  leads to trade in goods
and eventually to capital investment.  Worker placements were so successful  for both parties that
a company was formed in Slovenia to run the program entirely on a private basis.
Nearby Northern Italy has considerable demand for gast-arbeiters,  and there have been the
accompanying  social problems.  The Italian government has financed a study of the Slovenia-
Moldova experience to see if it could be adapted to Northern Italy.  It would seem that this ARIA
innovation could be applied broadly in other relative-Western  and Western  countries.  Indeed,
ARIA-initiated worker programs in Germany and France, modeled on the pilot program
developed in Slovenia, are in operation.
Continuous Improvement Programs
Interviews with some the repeat workers in the gast-arbeiter  program gave some surprising
answers to a question about their most valuable experience.  One might think that their most
valuable  learnings would be the new technologies, but the workers often said that the
15technologies they used were, for the most part, familiar to them.  What was really new was the
experience of working in an industrial  culture. After decades of socialism, the workplace spirit
and culture in the FSU countries had sunk to a rather low level.  One worker said that before
when he made a decision, he would not think about how it might cause problems for other
workers; he only thought "It won't be my problem."  But in the industrial culture of the Slovene
factory, he learned to think as part of a team and to take some responsibility for the broader
consequences of his decisions and actions.
Some of the experience of an industrial culture could be transferred back to a Moldovan factory
if there were enough retuming workers to form a critical mass.  But a more systematic means
was,needed for this form of restructuring in Moldovan enterprises.  Preparation of the PSD I/II
programs in Moldova started in June  1994 with a seminar held jointly by the Bank team leader
and Prof. Michael Best5 of the University of Massachusetts.  The seminar presented Iwao
Kobayashi's 20 Keys to Workplace Improvement [1990] methodology with the idea that this
engineering-based  approach would be better understood by ex-soviet managers then more classic
management training seminars.  However very few of more than a hundred top level managers
responded positively to the ideas presented and only one understood the need for, and the
principle of, continuous improvement.  It is only after few dozen workers from several Moldovan
companies passed through six month in-company training programs in Slovenia, Germany,  and
France did ARIA's initially failing efforts to try to introduce 20 Keys start to produce first
results.  Kobayashi's book was translated into Russian and training materials were developed for
managers and for workers  in the client enterprises.
Sweeping  Changes in  Moldovan  Factories
One of the clearest  indices  of the deteriorated  work culture  in many Moldovan  enterprises  was the  massive
accumulation  of trash.  The first of the twenty  keys was  "cleaning  and  organizing" the  workplace.  In the
ARIA companies instituting  the 20 Keys  program, literally  truckloads of junk were carried off.  The newly
cleaned spaces were then painted  in a light color that would show any new accumulation  of dirt.  This act of
sweeping,  cleaning,  and  painting by the managers  and workers  started the  long process of rebuilding their
self-esteem and pride in their workplace.
The 20 Keys program proved to be a great success in the ARIA and ex-ARIA consultants'
restructuring programs to build a quality-oriented  industrial  culture.  Eventually contact was
made with Kobayashi's company in Japan and the company in South Africa that holds of the
licensing rights for the programs in the West.  ARIA obtained the rights to be the exclusive
distributor of  the program in the Southeast Europe region.  Although only half a dozen ARIA
restructured companies initially agreed to pursue continuous improvement according to 20 Keys,
the early results were so impressive that now over ; score of Moldovan companies have adopted
the program.  The idea was re-exported to Slovenia and the Slovene government developed a
state-supported program that subsidizes introduction of the 20 Keys methodology to 60 Slovene
companies (selected through tender).  The international  organization of 20 Keys practitioners was
so impressed by the applications of the program in Moldova that their next world congress will
be hosted by ARIA in Moldova.
5  See Best 1990.
16A  Hlirschmanian  Approach to Social Learning and Change
Some insight into the Moldovan ARIA experience  can be gained by reflecting on Albert
Hirschmnan's  vision of economic change.  The Hirschmanian approach of "unbalanced growth"
was originally described as the contrast with the idea of a large coordinated  "big push" program
of change (e.g.,  as specified by a 'Christmas tree' of conditionalities)  implemented by the central
government  in an underdeveloped country.  The essential point was that if a country had the
institutional  capacity to implement a comprehensive  "balanced growth" program of change then
it would hardly be an underdeveloped  country.  Assuming that institutional  capacity in project
design was just assuming that which needed to be developed  in the first place.  Hirschman tried
to outline in more practical terms how institutional change might take place.
Instead of top-down across-the-board  change, one needed to find where change was afoot in the
small.
I began to look for elements and processes.. .that did work, perhaps  in roundabout
and unappreciated  fashion.  [T]his  search  for possible hidden rationalities  was  to
give an underlying unity to my work.... [T]he hidden rationalities  I was after were
precisely  and principally processes of growth and change already under way in
the  societies  I  studied,  processes  that  were  often  unnoticed  by  the  actors
immediately  involved,  as  well  as  by  foreign  experts  and  advisors."  [Hirschman
1984,  91-3]
The Best-of-the-Worst  principle is a strategy for finding those entry points.  Learning and change
is driven by problem-solving.  Not all problems can be attacked at once so attention and aid is
first focused in the small on the sectors or localities where some of the preconditions  are in place
and where initiative is afoot on its own-where the old is starting to transform  itself into the
new.  The preconditions  for learning and change are more likely to be in place among those
facing the most salient problems, namely among "the Worst" where change can no longer be
avoided by extracting further rents.  Amongst "the Worst" there are those who are willing to take
the initiative in a pragmatic learning process; they are the Best of the Worst.
Edmund Burke long ago captured  the idea that difficulties  (problems) give rise to learning, and
that one learning  leads on to more problem-solving.
[Difficulty]  has been the glory of the great masters  in all the  arts to confront,  and
to overcome;  and when  they had overcome  the  first  difficulty,  to turn  it  into  an
instrument  for  new  conquests  over new  difficulties;...  . He that  wrestles  with us
strengthens  our nerves, and sharpens our skill.  Our antagonist is our helper.  This
amicable  conflict with  difficulty  obliges us  to  an intimate  acquaintance  with our
object,  and compels us to consider  it in all its relations.  It will not suffer us to be
superficial.  [1937 (1790),  299-300]
Those who have more rents to collect still "suffer . ..to be superficial";  the others have to face
their problems.
17Hirschman then envisaged that the initial small successes would create pressures through the
forward and backward linkages to foster learning and change that is nearby in sectorial or
locational terms (in contrast to changes dictated by conditionalities).  One thing leads to, induces,
elicits, or entrains another thing through chains of "tensions, disproportions,  and disequilibria."
Hirschman at one point refers to the principle of unbalanced growth as "the idea of maximizing
induced decisionmaking"  [1994, 278].  The problem-solving pressures induced by unbalanced
growth will call forth otherwise  unused resources and enlist otherwise untapped energies.  As a
project moves from one bottleneck and crisis to another (in comparison with the smooth planned
allocation of resources in a project), then "resources  and abilities  that are hidden,  scattered, or
badly utilized" [1961,  5] will be mobilized.
Sometimes these projects might be initially in areas more isolated from the forces reinforcing the
low level traps (e.g., corrupt or predatory local governments).  The successes could then be
broadcast through publicity, public courses, and horizontal learning programs to those facing
similar problems.  That will start to break down the paralyzing  beliefs that "nothing can be done"
and will thus fuel broader initiatives that take the early wins as their inspiration and benchmark.
The successes will be copied and emulated to slowly build a constituency  for change to a scale
where it can have a reinforcing political effect.
Putting the Pieces  of the Puzzle  Together
Hirschman  uses the metaphor of a jigsaw puzzle  for the set of problems  facing a developing country  [1961,
81-2].  One  could  imagine  a rather superhuman  act of putting  all the pieces  together  at once to  solve  the
puzzle.  Indeed don't those who have seen and studied seemingly similar puzzles put together elsewhere  have
that knowledge?  That  is the  comforting  fantasy  of those  who  promote  comprehensive,  integrated,  and
balanced reform  programs.  Do all these things together (so that it looks like the  "picture on the puzzle box")
and you will have solved your problems!  But for the variety of reasons  outlined above, countries cannot just
solve all their problems at once.  They  must start with a few pieces that fit together and try to work outward
to  find other pieces that  fit.  Not all  entry points are  equal.  Certain pieces of the puzzle  may have nearby
connections  and  linkages  that  allow  building  that  part  of the  puzzle  quickly-as  opposed  to  parts  whose
solution might  give  little  insight  or impetus  to  solving  the  nearby  parts.  Perhaps  someone  who  has  seen
similar  puzzles  solved  would be  a  good coach  to suggest  promising  entry  points  or fruitful  directions  for
progress.  No doubt it would be helpful to study the "picture on the box."  But the actual solving of the puzzle
is  a  piecemeal  process  starting  in  one  or  more  propitious  places  and  working  outward  through  fruitful
linkages to finally arrive at the new overall configuration.
Conclusions
The ARIA Project illustrates some of the policies open to the Bank when macro-stability  is not
enough, when outside entrepreneurs  and managers are not coming to replace the local ones to
turn around the firms.
The success of the ARIA project in Moldova could also be understood in the context of a
Hirschmanian approach to social leaming and change:  finding the right decentralized entry
points in the small among the best of the worst, developing the project as a pragmatic learning
process, spreading the early wins through horizontal  learning programs and natural linkages, and
building a constituency for change on a scale large enough to then support broader political and
institutional change over a longer term.
18The project also supplies a perspective on the current debate about globalization.  Often that
debate is posed in terms of whether or not a country should be "open" to globalization.  The
ARIA experience indicates that this is not the right question.  Of course,  a country needs to be
open to whatever is compatible  with and will augment its autonomous  development.  Gandhi
used a good metaphor for the openness that is compatible with one's autonomy.  "I do not want
my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed.  I want the cultures of all
lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible.  But I refuse to be blown off my feet"
[Quoted in Datta  1961,  120]  By building on enough transformation  of their old into a new
foundation, the local change-agents  could remain "on their feet"  and have the self-confidence  to
seek out, assimilate, adapt, and own the external knowledge, experience,  and relationships
available  to them in a globalized world.
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